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Reconciliation and the Constitution:
A Transcript of the Roundtable
Amar Bhatia, Beverley Jacobs, Jonathan Rudin,
Douglas Sanderson, and Mark Walters*

As described in the opening piece in this Volume of the Supreme Court
Law Review, unprecedented national media and political attention was
given to the relationship between Indigenous people and the Canadian
state in 2016. As part of our conference, we asked a group of people to
come together and talk about the future of the Constitution as a means or
an obstacle to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and First Nations in
Canada. Amnesty International’s most recent global report on the State of
the World’s Human Rights praised Canada’s action regarding refugees, but
then noted that “[c]oncerns persisted about the failure to uphold the rights
of Indigenous Peoples in the face of economic development projects”.1
We asked our panelists about the connection between the rhetoric of
reconciliation and the situation on the ground. Would the Court continue to
play a significant role in the development of section 35 Aboriginal rights?
Are these discussions likely to play out in courts, at constitutional
amendment conferences, or in the political arena?
Generously contributing their thoughts and knowledge were, in
alphabetical order, Amar Bhatia, who joined Osgoode’s full-time faculty
on July 1, 2014 after serving as a Catalyst Fellow and Visiting Professor
at Osgoode for the 2013-14 academic year. He articled and worked in
union-side labour and employment law in Toronto before returning to
graduate school, and his current work looks at issues of status and
authority of migrant workers and Indigenous peoples under Canadian
immigration law, Aboriginal law, treaty relations, and Indigenous legal
traditions; Beverley Jacobs, now appointed to the University of Windsor
*
Amar Bhatia, Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School; Beverley Jacobs, Assistant
Professor, University of Windsor Faculty of Law; Jonathan Rudin, Program Director, Aboriginal Legal
Services in Toronto; Douglas Sanderson, Associate Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law;
and Mark Walters, F.R. Scott Professor of Public and Constitutional Law, McGill University.
1
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of the World’s
Human Rights, 22 February 2017, available at: <https://perma.cc/U6PY-RVNZ>.
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Faculty of Law. She lives and practices law at her home community of
Six Nations of the Grand River Territory in Southern Ontario. For the
past 20 or so years, much of her work has focussed on anti-violence work
including advocacy for families of missing and murdered Indigenous
women and girls and educating the public about the history and impacts
of colonization, which has resulted in the historic traumas that are
occurring to Indigenous peoples; Jonathan Rudin, hired in 1990 to
Aboriginal Legal Services and has been with ALS ever since, now as
Program Director. He co-wrote the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples’ report on Justice – Bridging the Cultural Divide – and was a
member of the Research Advisory Committee of the Ipperwash Inquiry;
Douglas Sanderson, on Faculty at the University of Toronto Faculty of
Law, was managing editor of the inaugural edition of the Indigenous Law
Journal in 2002 while a student. He went on to get his LL.M from
Columbia University. Professor Sanderson is a member of the Opaskwayak
Cree Nation, and he has been deeply engaged in Aboriginal issues from a
policy perspective. Professor Sanderson’s research areas include Aboriginal
and legal theory, as well as private law (primarily property law) and
public and private legal theory. His work uses the lens of material culture
and property theory to examine the nature of historic injustice to
Indigenous peoples and possible avenues for redress. Moving beyond the
framework of common law property rights and constitutional land/treaty
rights, his scholarship focuses on Aboriginal institutions, post-colonial
reconciliation, and rebuilding community; and finally, Mark Walters,
F.R. Scott Professor of Public and Constitutional Law at McGill
University since 2016. He has been a full time legal academic since his
appointment to the Faculty of Law at Queen’s in 1999 and he researches
and publishes in the areas of public and constitutional law, legal history,
and legal theory, with a special emphasis on the rights of Indigenous
peoples, institutional structures, and the history of legal ideas. In
addition, Osgoode Hall Law Dean Lorne Sossin contributed his
considerable talents as moderator.
We did not ask Panellists to submit papers for this Roundtable, but the
issue is so critical, and the contributions so thoughtful, that we were
determined to ensure the widest possible dissemination. What follows is a
text produced from a transcript of the event. We sent each speaker the
transcript of their portion and invited them to edit for clarity, and to
provide references that might assist the reader who wants to learn more,
before reassembling the whole for publication. Our hope is that what
follows will help to inspire, provoke, and inform our ongoing
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conversations about the practical and political meaning of “reconciliation”
— and its relationship to our constitutional order.
Benjamin Berger & Sonia Lawrence, Editors of this Volume
Lorne Sossin:

….. [A]s we bring this conference to its
conclusion, to its crescendo, by giving time to the
really remarkable group assembled for this last
panel on the vexing and compelling issues around
reconciliation. We’ve already heard a bit about
that in the panel on Daniels, for those who were a
part of that discussion, and of course the theme of
Reconciliation circles around so many issues of
importance to those gathered here today.
To join me in what will be a more conversational
[and] interactive panel on the topic, we’ve
assembled people from different perspectives and
life experiences, but all who are wrestling with
the common issues of where Reconciliation
comes from, what it means, where it is going, and
if it will take us where we need to go.
….

Beverley Jacobs:

I am going to introduce myself in my language first.
<Introduction in Cayuga>. What I said to you was
“Greetings of Peace to You” in Cayuga language,
which is one of the Six Nations which forms the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy. I am Bear Clan from
the Mohawk Nation, which is another one of the
Six Nations. I practice law part-time and I live at
the Six Nations Grand River Territory. I grew up in
my community all my life and lived there until
I went to law school. I want to share some
experiences and I am going to try and be as quick as
possible because I do not want to steal the stage
from my co-panelists. But what I want to talk about
is this issue about reconciliation; but it is more than
reconciliation. It is about truth — the truth about the
history of this place called Canada. Coming from
Haudenosaunee culture and my upbringing, I was
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raised very…politically, I guess you would say —
raised very traditionally and spiritually within my
longhouse tradition, and raised with chiefs and
clanmothers and faithkeepers from the time I was
born. And so, my experiences come from that.
In talking about the truth about this place called
Canada: the history of Canada does not exist
from 1867. It does not exist from the creation of
the British North America Act 1867. In fact, the
history of it goes way back. When we discuss the
history of legislation and law or colonial laws and
when we start talking about that history, our
original history comes as a result of truth and
reconciliation. Our relationship was about having
peace with early colonizers—one of them was the
British—and with the British, there was an early
treaty relationship called the Silver Covenant
Chain. It was our Haudenosaunee Leadership and
the Colonial Leadership that came to this
relationship, and it was about the land, and our
relationship to the land and how we would share
this land.
There were basic principles of this treaty
relationship, and I always use these principles to
also understand healthy relationships. There are
very basic principles of a healthy relationship:
friendship, peace, and respect. That was the
original relationship that we were supposed to
have. The British used an “Iron Chain” that
represented this relationship and it was later
changed to silver because they thought iron
would rust. They wanted to make sure those links
would not rust and fall apart. Then it was
established later in the years as a Wampum Belt,
the Covenant Chain.
All of that was built into this. [Bev raises and
points to the Two-Row Wampum Belt]. I just
want a show of hands to tell me if you know what
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this is? Oh good, there are a lot. I am happy about
that, because this represents Truth and
Reconciliation: this is what we must return to.
And this is what was based on those original
principles of peace, trust, respect, and friendship.
I won’t explain the Covenant Chain, because that
would require an additional 10 minutes, but the
history of this Belt is about sovereignty.
Haudenosaunee peoples have had a sovereign
identity since colonization and our Leadership
and our Confederacy have been very consistent in
that message since colonisation. So, this vessel
(on the belt) is a colonizer ship. Our Confederacy
Leadership created this relationship first with the
Dutch, then with the French, then with the
British, and then with the United States. It was
based on a Nation-to-Nation relationship, and
that we would continue on this river of life not
interfering with each other’s ways based on those
basic principles.

Figure 1: Two Row Wampum belt (Reproduction) Photograph by Nativemedia
(Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)].

With respect to the BNA 1867 and s 91(24) and
its establishment: it was unilateral, it was
colonial, and it reflected genocidal policies, and
its creation was to annihilate us as a people. It
was about controlling “Indians” and “lands
reserved for Indians”. That is what was
established under the BNA 1867, now called the
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Constitution. All of the sudden we became wards
of the Crown, where the Federal Government had
control of us as “Indian People,” and controlled
our lands and we became forced into their ship
(on the wampum, belt). What has happened is
that as a Confederacy, the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy that still exists today… it is now a
very thin line (on the wampum belt) compared to
this (the line signifying the colonizer’s ship on
the Belt) because we were never able to practice
our own sovereignty and develop our own
institutions that were part of that.
Who gave Britain the authority to do this? They
violated the Two Row Wampum relationship
immediately. And when you are violating a
relationship, it is called violence. And so we have
been in a violent relationship since colonization
to this day: it has not ended, we are still in it.
Because now we are forced into these legal
institutions, and trying to define what that means
within this colonial legal process and institution.
So, part of this is understanding that: that is what
I call truth. The truth of history. The truth of law.
And if we are going to reconcile this relationship,
that truth has to be understood, and it has to be
respected.
Until we get to that point, we are going to
continue to hash out what this all means, and we,
as Indigenous peoples, are going to suffer, as we
have suffered, as a result of those colonial racist
policies. So that is my “spiel.” That’s how I am
going to start this. Because that is what this is
about: it is about truth. It is more than just
reconciliation. We must be honest about that and
the relationship that we have. For me, as an
Haudenosaunee person who has now been trained
in this colonial legal system, and I have been
trained [also] in my own canoe, about my own
laws and customs and language. And I know
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what has happened. So, this is based on my own
experiences, and I can speak the truth about that.
So thank you. Nia:wen (Thank you).
Mark Walters:

We were asked to consider the Chief Justice of
Canada’s comment, that now is a constitutional
moment of sorts where we need to figure out
what it means to, as she put it, “reconcile
interests of First Nations’ interests with Crown
sovereignty”.
Bev has just mentioned sovereignty, but I think
Bev had a different kind of sovereignty in mind
than Crown sovereignty. It’s important to note the
formula that the Chief Justice used when making
her suggestion concerning reconciliation. The
formula, the passage that she’s paraphrasing, was
first used in the Van der Peet2 case in 1996 as a
way of explaining what the point of s 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 is: to reconcile the preexistence of Aboriginal peoples with Crown
sovereignty. This has always sounded to me a bit
like reconciliation as resignation. Aboriginal
peoples need to be resigned to the fact that they
live under Crown sovereignty.
The Chief Justice has said other things about
reconciliation at other times. In fact, in Van der
Peet itself, she was in dissent, and she expressed
reconciliation in an entirely different way: she
said there must be a reconciliation of the diverse
legal cultures of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
peoples,3 which strikes me as a much better way
of putting the point.
And, then, many years later, in the famous Haida
Nation4 case, [at] paragraph 20, she says something
very different again and much more in line with

2

R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 232.
4
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.).
3
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what Bev has in mind. She says the treaty process
must be one about reconciling “pre-existing
Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown
sovereignty”, that, in other words, “sovereignty
claims” must be reconciled through “honourable
negotiation”.5 Maybe that’s a more promising way
to think about reconciliation than the way that she
put it more recently, a way that, as mentioned,
appears to have been drawn from the older Van der
Peet case.
I know I only have a few minutes to start things
off. I think there’s a slide that I’ll just refer to
quickly. Since Bev was mentioning the Covenant
Chain series of treaties, I thought it would be
helpful to put up [referring to PowerPoint] an
image of the two Wampum Belts given at the
Niagara Treaty of 1764, which was one of many
council meetings where the Covenant Chain was
affirmed.
The imagery, I think, is quite remarkable. In both
of [the] belts, the idea of linking arms or holding
hands is emphasized, suggesting a conception
of reconciliation and suggesting as well that
reconciliation is hardly a new idea. It’s an ancient
idea. My sense, although this is not something I’m
qualified to speak about, is that reconciliation is
deeply integral to Indigenous legal cultures. I think
it’s also a concept that must be very deeply integral
to the non-Indigenous conception of legality or the
rule of law. Once we start thinking about the
meeting of legal cultures, maybe reconciliation is
the concept that allows the two cultures to come
together in terms of their respective conceptions
of law and legal relationships. So I’ll stop there
for now.

5

Id., at para. 20.
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Figure 2: Photograph of replica of The Covenant Chain Wampum presented by
Sir William Johnson at the conclusion of the Council of Niagara. This replica
was commissioned by Nathan Tidridge and created by Ken Maracle of the
Seneca Nation.

Lorne Sossin:

Excellent. Thank you very much. Douglas, the
question for you is, is this judicial creativity or
are they making stuff up?

Douglas Sanderson:

They are totally making stuff up. Ni-ti-ki-ni-son,
Amo Binashe, amisk ni dodem. My Cree name is
Amo Binashe, it means hummingbird, and I’m
from the Beaver Clan of the Opaskwayak Cree.
Go fighting Cree!
I want to begin by answering a question that I’m
sure is on all your minds and the answer is yes,
these chairs are a thousand times more comfortable.
Literally, a thousand times.

Mark Walters:

It’s warm up here too!

Douglas Sanderson:

Yeah. So, the idea of reconciling First Nations’
interests with Crown sovereignty, I think highlights
a contrast with what I think is the fundamental
lesson that should have come out of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s Report. And I think
the Report makes clear that the chief injustice —
the stealing and abusing children is of course
terrible and awful — but the primary problem was
the belief that Indigenous cultures were less
valuable than settler cultures. That mindset underlay
the policy of the residential schools.
What does it mean to believe that Indigenous
cultures are as valuable as settler cultures? Well,
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if we take that teaching seriously, then there are
implications. One of the implications is that we
have to look at the way Court continues to
essentialize Indigenous people and Indigenous
cultures. And we’re going to talk more about that
in the next round.
But the idea of sovereignty itself and the idea that
the Crown is asserting sovereignty over
Indigenous people is part of that essentialization
of Indigenous people. McLachlin CJ says in
Tsilhqot’in,6 the latest Aboriginal title case we
have, that what the Crown is asserting is
something she calls “radical title.”7 And when she
says this, there’s no footnote about what radical
title is. There is no commentary. There is no
explanation. She just says that radical title is
being asserted.
I went looking to figure out what radical title is
and it’s complicated but in Imperial history, what
radical title is, is the right of a sovereign to assert
sovereignty over a foreign territory. It does not
give them the right to occupy the land but it gives
them the right to create laws that give the land
away.
Strangely, occupation has been at the core of civil
law since, at least, Roman times—two thousand
years. And at least since medieval times in the
common law tradition, occupation of land is
possession of land, and possession is the root of
title at common law. We forget that when
Europeans beg[a]n the period of exploration in
the sixteenth and seventeenth century, it’s also the
time that they begin developing concepts of
international law. How is it that European nations
are going to interact with one another when they
6
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, 2014
SCC 44 (S.C.C.).
7
Id., at paras. 12, 18, 69, 71.
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encounter each other at the high seas and on
distant lands? Occupation plays an essential role
in the development of international law: it founds
the foundational concepts of international law.
But what happens is that European Powers decide
that occupation is something that they get to
assume and that Indigenous people don’t get to
assume. And this is an idea that is not far off in
our current day. If you remember back to the trial
decision in Delgamuukw,8 there, McEachern
CJSC felt that Indigenous peoples lived lives that
were nasty and brutish and short; that they were
too disorganized to have property rights… to
have the ability to occupy their own lands and
territories they’ve lived in for ten thousand years,
because they weren’t civilized enough to have
laws that would allow them to fully occupy their
land in the way the Europeans were able to.
And today’s Court continues a version of this
legal fiction. We’re going to talk about that in the
next round and how, I think, we can begin to
address these legal fictions. Thanks.
….
Jonathan Rudin:

Thank you, Lorne. Thank you, Mark. So I’m
going talk about reconciliation in a slightly
different way. And I’m going to say that I’m
troubled by the way we use reconciliation in law.
And I think we use reconciliation and I think it
can obscure reality. So if you think about the
TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission], as
Douglas said, we are talking about an event or a
series of events that were done. So, for the
residential school — there is a legacy from the
residential school. The TRC makes a number of
recommendations, wonderful recommendations,

8
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1991] B.C.J. No. 525, 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185, [1991] 3
W.W.R. 97 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw (Trial)”].

284

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

that acknowledge the harm that was done by
residential school and its legacy.9
And in the context of an act or a series of acts
like residential school, we can think “Well, what
do we do to reconcile that?” But the difficulty
with the term reconciliation, as I hear it, and I
think, people understand it, is: We did something,
we Canadian non-Indigenous society, we did
something — it wasn’t good, it still has its
impacts, we have to try and fix it. That’s
“reconciliation”. But that misses a whole set of
things that are going on now. And I’ll start with a
look at three Supreme Court cases that were not
Charter cases: Williams,10 Gladue,11 and
Ipeelee.12 And those cases all say that Aboriginal
people face, in the criminal justice system, direct
and systemic discrimination. That direct and
systemic discrimination doesn’t arise from a
thing. That’s not a circumstance of residential
school. That’s an attitude that is held and
behaviors that are undertaken by people in power.
If we talk about ... If we say “reconciliation”, that
makes it sound like there was something that was
done. It’s not something that was done, it is
something that is — it is something that currently is
happening. And when we talk about reconciliation
as though we’re fixing something that happened, it
makes it seem like something is not currently
happening. It is currently happening.
We see it all the time. It is playing out in
Saskatchewan in the Colten Boushie case.

9
Truth and Reconciliation Canada. (2015). Honouring the truth, reconciling for the future:
Summary of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. Winnipeg:
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada.
10
R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, 159 D.L.R. (4th) (S.C.C.).
11
R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
12
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2012 SCC 13 (S.C.C.).
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I’ve spent a lot of time in Thunder Bay and
Indigenous kids—Indigenous people in Thunder
Bay—get things thrown at them when they’re on
the street, when they’re going to school. That is
not a thing that was, that is a thing that exists, it
has always existed independent of anything that
Aboriginal people, Indigenous people ever did.
It’s an attitude that needs to be confronted
directly and sometimes, I think the term
reconciliation obscures that reality and that’s
what I’ll start with. Thank you.
….
Amar Bhatia:

Thank you. Thanks for also having me on the
panel, where I feel highly unqualified, but here
we go.
I just wanted to talk about a couple ideas of
reconciliation as someone who’s mostly
interested in this topic from immigration law and
refugee law [perspectives], and dealing with
migrant worker issues as well. Also [as] someone
who is a son of immigrants from India and the
Philippines, I didn’t automatically think about
some of these issues dealing with title and treaties
when I was here at law school at Osgoode.
Part of [what] my understanding about
reconciliation has come to mean since then is
going to Delgamuukw and the idea about
reconciling with Crown sovereignty. Also there’s
the phrase that was at the end there, talking about
how we’re all here to stay13 and the idea that we
are all stuck with each other. This resonated for
me in the sense that for immigrant and migrant
demands, there’s often a demand for permanent
status, for secure status to be here to stay. But that

13
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153
D.L.R. (4th) 193 at para. 186 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”].
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kind of contrasts with these different ideas of
reconciliation that are highly contested.
Part of the idea of reconciliation is to have
respect for relations. Coming out of the TRC, in
some definitions outside of the Court is to work
towards respectful relations, maybe even ones
characterized by peace, friendship, respect and
trust. And that’s a little bit different if you’re
thinking about who is here to stay, in the context
of what other folks were mentioning, which is
these permanent structures of colonial law, of
criminal law that people are living with.
And there, I think there’s a different idea, it’s
outside of law. The idea of settler colonialism,
where it’s relating with all of these areas of law. It
has to do with the taking of land, the removal of
people from the land, and then the replacement of
those people by other people. So, if you look at
law within the structure of settler colonialism,
then you can kind of measure, I think, the
comments and rhetoric about reconciliation: that
is, to say, what is it [the State] doing about the
land that was taken, what is it doing about the
people who are removed from that land, and what
is it doing in the context of the replacement of
those people on those lands.
I guess there’s a lot more to say about that, but
we’ve also talked about sovereignty. Just to keep
in mind, maybe when I come back in the second
round. There’s a few things you need for
sovereignty in one definition of it, right? You
have to have a defined territory, you have to have
a permanent population, you have to have a
government, and you have to have the capacity to
enter into international relations.
You can look at any of those things through the
lens of Aboriginal law and Indigenous law and
see how they play out. If you’re looking at it in
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the context of defined territory, and the title
decisions we’ve been talking about, either you
would have title or you would have a treaty.
Right? And that’s supposed to be how you work
towards reconciliation.
In terms of the permanent population, there’s been
talk about giving control back over membership
determination, and that’s where I’m interested in
the immigration context. But it doesn’t go to the
level of allowing First Nations, for instance, to
adopt folks who don’t have Canadian citizenship
or permanent resident status for that matter. So it
sort of stays within the borders of the state
sovereignty as to who can become a member, and
I think that’s one of the measures of whether or not
you’re having reconciliation that addresses settler
colonialism. Because I don’t think it was the case
before, that Indigenous nations were limited in
who might be an immigrant in the context of who
might be a member. That’s only something that the
colonial state imposed that we continue through
the Citizenship Act, the Immigration Act and the
Indian Act.
Lorne Sossin:

Thanks, Amar. Thanks to all the panelists for
getting started and I think where we are left as we
move now to our second round of really where
we can take the concept of Reconciliation — to
what extent can it bring us to a better set of
relationships, a better set of constitutional and
societal outcomes? How can we come to terms
with recognizing the problematic point of origin
of Reconciliation in the colonial experience.
At the moment, we don’t have a shared
understanding of Reconciliation, or even what
tense in which to speak of it: is reconciliation what
we need to prepare for, or a process that is already
underway? Is it something that is born of the very
same presumptions and biases that animated the
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colonial enterprise of asserting sovereignty or is it
a process of reconciling sovereignty itself, peoples,
communities, and individuals. Clearly the TRC
process gives us a window into what is both going
to be a personal and community, legal and social
and interpersonal journey.
So, because Reconciliation can mean all those
things, some have recognized that is an ideal vessel
through which, to express all the different layers of
relationships with Indigenous peoples, legal and
otherwise, that need to be mediated. It will mean
many things to many people. And that’s why you’d
be hard-pressed to find many people who disagree
or oppose Reconciliation. What they disagree about
is whether Reconciliation has any shared meaning,
who should be doing the heavy lifting and where
it’s going to take us.
So, as we bring texture to where the concept of
Reconciliation comes from (and not just the Chief
Justice’s statement, but this discourse that so
dominates Nation-to-Nation politics and our
Constitutional s 35 and other legal interpretations),
we come back to the question of where should it go.
This question brings us to the second round of
questions. We’ll stick to the same order.
Bev Jacobs:

Okay. Thank you. So, in my impassioned
introduction, I talked about being raised in my
“canoe,” in the sense of understanding this
relationship… because this is how I was raised,
when I said I was raised politically. That’s how
strong our people have been — to continue to
understand this relationship, which was also
based on peace. Our Constitution is called the
Great Law of Peace.
The Great Law of Peace enabled international
law to occur because it brought together five,
then later six, separate Nations.
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And one of the principles of the Great Law of
Peace was called the Tree of Peace. When it was
planted, its roots were to spread, and anyone who
was to find its roots and follow the source, they
would be protected under the branches of the
Great Law. And in our language, “onkwehonwe”
means human being. It doesn’t mean that there’s
a color. It means that we’re all human. Our laws
are based on humanness and about human
relationships and relationships with all the natural
world.
Our Constitution, the Great Law of Peace, is very
complex and it includes everything. There’s no
separation between spirituality or healthiness or
ceremony or leadership. It all encompasses the
same thing. And so when we establish those
relations with other Nations, we thought that was
going to be the same way with the colonizers.
We have never forgotten or ever stopped
believing that. It’s always been inherent in our
relations to have peaceful relationships. And
that’s what reconciliation is.
So whose responsibility is it? It’s all of our
responsibility. When it comes to educating about
this history — about how Eurocentric Canadian law
is trying to reconcile Indigenous peoples within the
[one] ship. And that’s difficult to do because it also
is very complex when people are not educated
about our history and who we are as a People. And
that’s frustrating, it’s very frustrating. I’ve been in
politics, in colonial Canadian politics as a leader of
the Native Women’s Association of Canada, and
sitting at political tables and talks with
parliamentarians on the other side. They gave me
ten minutes to meet and to have a conversation
about the real history but most do not have a clue
about the Indian Act or about the impacts of
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colonization and where the sources of these
genocidal policies have come from.
So that’s the frustration. And then there’s teaching. I
have been teaching not only undergraduate level
courses but in law school as well. In law school,
students say “How come I didn’t learn this before?
How come I’m just learning about this now?” And
so that’s where the frustration and, hopefully, where
this reconciliation comes into place in establishing
peaceful relationships. That we’re all on the same
intellect, that we’re all in the same way of thinking,
because that’s what our teachings have always
taught us: to have one mind. That’s what that meant.
That we were all going to have one mind. We’re all
going to come into this room and we’re all going to
have that same intellect and reason to have peace.
So, it didn’t just mean that we have peace as an
individual and within our Nationhood, but rather
that we think that you too have peace and that your
Nationhood has peace. And so I wonder about that.
I wonder about that understanding of what peace
means and what peaceful relationships means.
That’s where my response to the Chief Justice and
the comment of [reconciling] First Nations interests
with Crown sovereignty comes in. We’re not a
special interest group. That’s been out of Canadian
Law for a long time. We’re not a special interest
group, and that’s what Canadians think. Canadians
think that we’re a minority group with special
interests. That’s not the truth.
The truth is that our lands and our nationhood
have been stolen away as a result of colonial law.
And that law was used as a tool of assimilation
and that law was based on colonial and genocidal
policies. That’s the truth. So part of this whole
process was coming to an understanding about
these laws and policies. I had to come to peace
with that as a Haudenosaunee person. And so,
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how do we bring this relationship back? It’s like
returning back to this healthy relationship of
peace, trust and respect. Our teachings are very
simple.
There has to be a return to the teachings and
principles of the Covenant Chain and the Two
Row Wampum. It has to. It has to, because there
are things happening in the natural world that we
don’t have control of as human beings. And that’s
what our teachings are about. Our teachings are
about this humanness and how we need to have
these relationships with each other; peaceful
relationships, because we need to learn how to
live on Mother Earth. That’s inevitable. So, it’s
not just up to us as Indigenous peoples to
reconcile with Canadian genocidal policies.
We’re all descendants of this. Everyone has a
responsibility to understand that.
Thank you.
Mark Walters:

Thanks, Bev. I’m glad I get to follow you because
you have given me lots of ideas about what to say.
I’ll go back to the Haudenosaunee Great Tree of
Peace, because of course there’s another tree in the
room, I guess you could say, the “Living Tree” of
the Constitution of Canada. Both the
Haudenosaunee and Canadian Constitutions are
trees.
I like your tree better [Bev], actually. The Living
Tree of the Canadian Constitution seems to be
growing in one direction from a single root. The
branches and foliage develop, but everything
must be traced back to that single trunk and its
root, and I have a suspicion that this image has
something to do with the character of Crown
sovereignty.
In contrast, your tree has many roots, and the
roots themselves are growing and spreading
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outwards; so, in other words, the tree is growing
in both directions at once. It’s a better image,
because it’s less linear. There seems to be no
beginning to the tree—no single sovereign point
of origin.
This leads me back to Crown sovereignty. The
conception of reconciliation of Aboriginal
peoples or interests with Crown sovereignty
seems to imply quite a linear conception of law,
something that is traced back to a root or
originating phenomenon, namely, Crown
sovereignty. However, perhaps part of the
reconciliation process is for non-Indigenous
people to rethink their bold conception of what
law is. Perhaps it is time to contemplate the
possibility of a more circular and less linear view
of what law is, a more interpretive or dynamic
view of what law is. But getting in the way of this
reconception of law is the originating root for
Canadian law, the Crown sovereign. Oddly
enough, the term “Crown sovereignty” isn’t used
very often elsewhere in our law. This is largely
because the Crown isn’t really sovereign in
Canada, and indeed in the British constitutional
tradition the Crown hasn’t been sovereign since
the 17th century at least. The conception of
“Crown sovereignty” therefore seems to be sui
generis, to borrow an expression; it is unique to
Aboriginal law cases in Canada.
In the Westminster tradition, Parliament may be
sovereign or the Crown-in-Parliament may be
sovereign. But in Canada we don’t even
recognize that. We have a Constitution that limits
the sovereignty of legislatures at both federal and
provincial levels. I am not sure why this business
of referring to “Crown sovereignty” in Aboriginal
law cases developed. But I think we should get
rid of it because it’s getting in the way of what
we really mean; if you look closely at the cases,
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when the courts refer to Crown sovereignty, what
they are really referring to is the legislative
sovereignty of either the provinces or of
Parliament. However, legislative sovereignty in
Canada is already constrained by so many
constitutional rules and laws that to speak of
sovereignty at all is, again, misleading. Stripped
of the language of sovereignty and Crown, what
is usually at stake in these cases is simply the
ability of the legislature to act in the public
interest subject to relevant constitutional laws and
principles.
To rephrase the statement from Van der Peet with
these points in mind, then, what the Court is
really saying is that we have to reconcile the fact
that Aboriginal people have certain rights with
the broader public interest. However, once we see
the task in those terms, the rigidity of Crown
sovereignty is replaced by a more supple notion.
Sovereignty seems fixed and uncompromising.
You can’t question sovereignty, can you? No, it
will be said, because without its sovereign
foundation our country will fall apart…the trunk
of the Living Tree will be chopped down, or
something like that. But if we are merely
adjusting our sense of the public interest to
accommodate Aboriginal rights, then the
consequences are far less dramatic: the public
interest is not fixed and unbending; it can and
must make room for Canada’s Indigenous reality.
So, the things that are being reconciled may be
seen in a completely different light and, if so,
then I would suggest that a different kind of
balance altogether might be reached than one in
which Crown sovereignty is on one side and
weighs so heavily in the scales. Those are my
thoughts for now.
Lorne Sossin:

That sounds great.
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Mark Walters:

For now.

Douglas Sanderson:

Alright. Thank you. When we finished in the last
round, I was talking about Delgamuukw at the trial
level,14 and I know you’re all thinking “well, oh,
but it was appealed and it went all the way to the
Supreme Court and then we got the Delgamuukw
test for Aboriginal title.” But, I think the Court goes
off the rails in Delgamuukw in some significant
ways and I’m going to talk about the ways in
which the Court makes things up.
So the approach that the court lays out for itself is
the sui generis approach, thank you, Mark. It is
not like other things, they say, which gives the
court a pretty free hand to shape Aboriginal law
in any way that it really deems fit.
One of the things that happened in Delgamuukw
at the Supreme Court level is procedurally, Lamer
CJ says, “Chief Justice McEachern , you did a
really crappy job running the trial. You didn’t
deal with the evidence problem… so we’re going
to have a new trial.” And then he says, “Oh, but
first let me lay out the test for Aboriginal title
even though I don’t have any evidence before me,
except the evidence that I just said was too
crappy to run a trial.”
So he lays out the test, and one of the parts of the
test is this idea that Aboriginal title lands are held
communally. And it’s another part of the
judgment where there is no footnote. There’s no
explanation. Lamer feels it in his gut that
Aboriginal title is held communally because he’s
seen like… Western movies, I guess, and read
Louis L’Amour novels or something? Had he
actually evaluated the evidence that was
submitted by the anthropologists including Mills

14

Delgamuukw (Trial), supra, note 8.
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and others, he would have learned that Gitskan
and Witsuwet’in lands are held by Chiefs and
Houses and they exercise authority, and we have
ways of transferring those chiefly titles that come
with distinct property interests. There was a reason
why, when the Russians first encountered the
Gitskan they called [them] “Men of Property.”
So, [to] the idea that title lands are held
communally, Lamer CJ then extends the idea that
they are held inter-generationally, in fact. And
this puts a very serious constraint on the use of
Aboriginal title lands. Lamer CJ says …. Because
the lands have to be held inter-generationally, it
means that you cannot develop the land in a way
that would destroy the First Nation’s attachment
to the land. And the example given is that you
cannot develop a parking lot on a hunting site. So
if you can’t build a parking lot, why would you
build a road? If you can’t build a road, what on
earth could you possibly do in your territory?
And this is all based on something that Lamer
just made up. That he just felt strongly about.
Because he has an idea of what Aboriginal people
and Indigenous people are like. The Court
essentializes Indigenous people and then uses that
to limit rights and title.
Lamer CJ actually goes further, right? So
remember, the case is being thrown, [and]
ordered for a new trial. He lays out the test and
then he says, “Well, now I’m going to talk about
justification of trenching Aboriginal title rights.”
All of this is totally obiter, there’s no reason for
us to be having this discussion. There’s no part in
the Delgamuukw trial where the government is
trying to justify its actions in some place.
And so, what have we learned? Well, we’ve
learned because First Nations people have to
reconcile their title with the assertion of Crown
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sovereignty, that means that Aboriginal title rights
can be trenched by governments wanting to do
things like build hydroelectric dams or engage in
forestry or mining or the settlement of foreign
populations. This is like the one place in our
Constitution, the court just comes out and says,
“I understand you have the Constitutional
protective right, but the government has a policy.
They want to settle some foreigners, so your
Constitutionally protected right has to give way.”
But I don’t think it has to be this way. First of all,
I’m not going to deny that the Crown can act as a
sovereign. We have a pretty nuanced sense of
sovereignty in Canada. We already split between
the federal and provincial governments, so I think
there’s a way that we could share the idea of
sovereignty [with Indigenous peoples]. In fact,
there is a case on this. Someone challenged the
Nisga’a treaty, and the reason they challenged it
was because the Nisga’a had, in the Nisga’a
treaty settlement… they were allocated powers
that are federal and provincial. They act as a
federal actor and a provincial actor within their
territories. Someone challenged them. The case is
Sga’nism Sim’augit (Chief Mountain) v.
Canada.15 And the court said, the BC Court of
Appeal said no, the distribution of power under
ss 91 and 92 is not absolute.
So there’s no reason that we couldn’t distribute
jurisdiction more fairly to the Indigenous
Peoples. And there’s a way that we can come to
respect Indigenous laws and territory. And it has
nothing to do with s 35. In fact, s 35, the sui
generis approach, has taken us takes us
completely the wrong way.

15
House of Sga’nism v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] B.C.J. No. 179, 2013 BCCA 49,
[2013] 2 C.N.L.R. 226 (B.C.C.A.).
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Everyone forgets now, but in 1980 there was a
case called Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Minister of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development.16 It
involved Indian people asserting Aboriginal title
over the land. So, it was pre-Charter, pre-section
35. It made its way up to the Federal Court of
Appeal, and Judge Judson, I think, settles the
case on the basis of common law customary law.
He asks five questions. He says, “Do you have
laws relating to land?” And we might also add
related to government, if you’re asking that
question. “Have you had these laws since time
immemorial?” Check. “Are they cognizable to the
common law? Can the common law look at those
laws and understand them?” Yes, check. “Are they
repugnant to the common law, do they create some
set of laws or values that the common law just
can’t stand?” No. “Have those laws been
extinguished explicitly?” No. You have title.
We can ask ourselves the same questions about
Indigenous rights to govern their territories. The
“jiggery pokery” of the suis generis approach has
allowed the court to essentialize Indigenous
people and then use those characterizations
against Aboriginal rights and title. And there’s no
need to do it. A common law tradition has room
for Indigenous title and Indigenous governmental
rights. And it’s about time that we deterred to the
traditions of the common law to seek justice for
Indigenous people in Canada. Thank you.
….
Jonathan Rudin:

Thanks. As Lorne said, we [at Aboroginal Legal
Services Toronto] spend a fair amount of time in
court ... And again, our focus is not exclusively but
deals a lot with criminal issues because Indigenous

16
Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development),
[1979] F.C.J. No. 184, [1980] 1 F.C. 518, [1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 17 (TD) (F.C.C.).
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people are massively over-represented. Because
there’s systemic and direct discrimination towards
Aboriginal people, so we spend a lot of time in
court. Can we achieve reconciliation through
courts? So here’s the pessimistic part. We haven’t.
Not only we haven’t, but the court has explicitly
rejected that option when they had it.
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada had the
case of R. v. Kokopenace,17 which was a Charter
case, it was a fair trial and right to jury case
brought by Mr Kokopenace who had been
convicted of second degree murder in Kenora. I
won’t go through all the details. The Ontario
government… basically, there were no First
Nations people who lived on reserve who were
really on the jury rolls in the Kenora district
because the Ontario government couldn’t give a
crap to do the work to get people on. That,
admittedly, is my opinion. Also, the opinion that
belongs to Aboriginal Legal Services and the
opinion that we’ve developed after being
involved in this issue by the time it got to the
Court, for 10 years.
The majority decision in Kokopenace, [written
by] Justice Moldaver… one of the reasons…
there were many reasons to reject this argument.
But one argument that Ontario brought was: “the
reason why Aboriginal people aren’t on juries is
because they don’t want to be on juries. And
there’s a lot of reasons for them, it’s very
complicated.” And they pointed to a Justice
Iacobucci’s report on First Nations’ representation
on juries in Ontario, which was commissioned as
a result of Ontario ignoring Indigenous people in
the first place.

17

R. v. Kokopenace, [2015] S.C.J. No. 28, [2015] 2 SCR 398, 2015 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).
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And Ontario’s argument is “Well, we can’t really
fix this ourselves because it’s very complicated
and Indigenous people have lots of reasons they
don’t want to be on juries.” And Justice Moldaver
says, “Yeah, it’s really hard. Reconciliation needs
to happen.” He compliments Ontario for the steps
that they were taking, because they are taking
steps, and he says “But that’s not for us. That’s
not for the court to do, that’s someone else. So
let’s move on and we’ll let this happen
somewhere else.” And the Minority decision—
there was [also] a concurring judgment by Justice
Karakatsanis—but in the Minority decision,
written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice
Cromwell, Justice Cromwell said: “Well, the
reason Aboriginal people aren’t participating in
juries is because they don’t have any faith in the
system, and the reason they don’t have any faith
in the system is because of what the state did, so
it hardly lies with the state to say we can’t fix a
problem, 'cause we created something and it’s so
intractable that we can’t fix it. That doesn’t seem
right at all.” But that was the minority.
So, that’s a very depressing decision and I will,
without making too much comment, just contrast
that with Justice Moldaver not being concerned at
all in Jordan with revamping the whole system18
… although there are very complex reasons for
that [the need to revamp the right to trial within a
reasonable time jurisprudence], but that’s okay to
sort of impose a bunch of arbitrary guidelines [in
the Jordan context]. Anyway.
But nevertheless, because we are gluttons for
punishment, and my colleague Emily Hill is here,
we are both gluttons for punishment as are all of us
at Aboriginal Legal Services. We continue with this
task of trying to challenge the way that laws work.
18

R. v. Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
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But the way we’re trying to do it, we’re trying to do
it differently and we’ll see if this works. We have
been a part of a number of section 15 challenges to
criminal law. Because if you start with the finding
by the Supreme Court that Aboriginal people face
direct and systemic discrimination in the criminal
justice system, that’s a finding of the court. And we
look at the section 15 jurisprudence, the state is not
supposed to make inequality worse, and we have
many examples, and Joe Arvay [the Keynote
speaker at Osgoode Constitutional Cases
Conference] talked about a number, we have many
examples of how the state has made this worse.
This should be a s 15 issue. This is an issue of
equality. This isn’t an issue of arbitrariness,
overbreadth, or gross disproportionality. Let’s get
away from s 7, let’s call it what it is.
What it is, is a perpetuation of inequality. So we
have done this twice, we’ve lost once, we won
once at the OCJ level, we will eventually get this
matter heard at the Superior Court because there
are no Jordan rules on appeals. These things can
take forever. And we’re starting another one in
Brampton.
But this is what we’re starting to do and in the
whatever number of years it’s going to take,
because I do agree with Joe [Arvay] as well, the
federal government is not hurriedly repealing the
mandatory minimums, so there’s lots of room for
us to continue litigation, sadly — we’ll have a
better sense if we’re able to be successful. And I
just want to say, if we’re not successful, it could
be that we don’t make a good argument, it’s not
necessarily that if you don’t like us you’re a
racist. It’s possible there’s better arguments but
I’ll be interested in whether the courts are willing
to grapple with those issues because they often
are not, and so we’re trying to put it front and
centre and see what happens.
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Lorne Sossin:

Excellent. Amar, to close off our second round.

Amar Bhatia:

So, I just wanted to pick up on some of the things
that folks have talked about in relation to
sovereignty and, also, as I was mentioning before
in terms of, for instance, the “permanent
population” part of the sovereignty definition…
which may be inappropriate… but I’m going to
run with it and see how that works compared to
reconciliation.
If you need a permanent population to have
sovereignty, you could also have a society
reproduce itself. How does this happen?
Historically this was happening through treaties
for the settlement of foreign populations, also
even for the infringement of title… that phrase
‘settlement of foreign populations’ is still there.
And then what does that mean in terms of having
reconciliation? The idea that we’re all here to
stay that can work both for reconciliation and that
could work for migrant rights, that can also work
for continuing the settler colonialism that I
mentioned before. It doesn’t actually disrupt that
structure.
If you want to maybe talk about it in a way that
would work towards reconciliation that does
challenge that structure, the TRC has talked
about that as part of their calls to action and
that people should be educated about the treaties,
and specifically in the context of citizenship,
immigration,
settlement,
multiculturalism,
“newcomers”, there’s the idea that you should
educate folks about the treaties there. I think the
government is actually going to follow through
with this one, which is to put recognition and
acknowledgement of the treaties in the
Citizenship Oath.
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So, partly, this is again bringing that idea of this
awareness of the treaties in order to move people
towards reconciliation. But what that doesn’t
really get to is the idea about who gets to be a
citizen in the first place and on what basis. If
historically the treaties were used in order to
settle the lands, and these are treaties that are
between parties that are formed by both colonial
law and Indigenous law, then presumably these
[are]... I like to think of them as the first
immigration laws. And I think that also means
that Indigenous nations still have authority over
immigration matters.
So if you’re simply restricting reconciliation to
folks who are already citizens, I don’t think that
really gets to the question of how societies can
reproduce themselves. One example in this
context is if a First Nation tries to adopt a failed
refugee claimant through a band council
resolution, do you think that would keep that
person in the country? Anyone? …
So, show of hands if you think that will keep
someone in the country. Yeah. Aspirationally?
One person… one and half hands. It doesn’t keep
someone in the country, partly because if you’re
adopted under a Band Council Resolution, then
that doesn’t actually give you Indian Act status.
And so this goes to court and the argument is
made that if this is happening, that the adoption
should read into the Immigration Act that this
person has Indian status and should also be
allowed to stay in the country… just like others
who are allowed to enter and remain… those who
have citizenship in Canada.
The court kind of laughs this off, they don’t really
advance a full-blown articulation of the treaty
right about why that’s important. But partly it is
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because of the floodgates fear. As you can
imagine, anyone in immigration and refugee law,
this is like the big fear: the opening of the
floodgates, which is a bit hilarious again in the
settler colonial history of Canada that they’re
worried about that. Anyway, without any irony,
they say, “how can we have almost 600 First
Nations being in charge of these decisions about
immigration and citizenship and things like that,
it just doesn’t make any sense.”
Another fear was that if somebody like a failed
refugee claimant is adopted into a band, that
they’re in some kind of indentured status to that
band that can revoke their membership and then
they’ll be out of luck in terms of their security of
staying in the country.
So, on the floodgates fear: if you just compare
how many people Canada gives labor market
opinions to and the immigration context for work
permits ... It’s much more than 600. If you look at
the fear about an indentured status: again if
you’re comparing to the temporary worker
program that we run —where agricultural
workers can never get permanent status, where
caregivers have even lost some of the guarantees
they had before about apply[ing] for permanent
resident status—it doesn’t really make a lot of
sense to me in terms of the fears about why this
would happen [or of why] they say this should
not be possible.
I think that’s kind of a different and longer
question, but partly it goes to essentializing
people and who actually has control over the
determination of their membership and their
Nation, and why it is that only Canada gets to
decide this for everybody. I think, if you measure
reconciliation by that, it’s still going to fall short.
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Listening to Amar talk I was reminded of
something that happened to me last fall. Or
maybe it was in the summer with all the Syrian
refugees who were coming to Canada. And
I thought, “what do you have to do to adopt a
Syrian refugee?”
There’s the government of Canada website, and
so I went on the website and you have to answer
this questionnaire and the very first question is
“Are you a status Indian?” And I was blown
away! I thought “I can’t do this anymore!” Just
filed it away and completely forgot about it until
this very minute. So they really do not want
status Indians adopting… it’s like, that will get
you out of the game right away.

Lorne Sossin:

That is more an invitation for more discussion
than a comment that should close our discussion,
but we are sadly at that time. I’ll invite those —
I hope there are many in this category—who have
some more questions to stay around for a few
minutes after the formal end of the panel. Before
I wrap up …. I just want to share a reflection that
Murray Sinclair offered when he was standing
here a week or so ago, giving a really wonderful
lecture sponsored by the History Department here
at York University. …
[I]t goes to, I think, a theme, that’s been woven
throughout each of these comments. Murray
Sinclair made the point that reconciliation isn’t
itself decolonizing. By saying the word it makes
you feel good; but that good feeling is not one
that you should trust. Reconciliation, if it is going
to be meaningful at all, should be hard for
Indigenous communities, because it invokes pain
both individually and shared and that continues,
and [moreover], for non-Indigenous people, it
also should be hard, because there is a lot of work
to do to decolonize.
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Murray Sinclair’s point was that invoking
reconciliation does not change any of the colonizing
tendencies that seem so embedded in the whole
existential structure of Canada’s history. I think that
was something that resonated again for me here —
and I will of course, reflect on much of what
I learned and I hope you do as well.
END

